President Donald Trump in the Oval Office of the White House in Washington, DC, US, on Thursday, Aug. 14, 2025. Credit – Will Oliver—EPA/Bloomberg/Getty Images
As President Donald Trump sits down with Vladimir Putin at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson today, it will become clear if he is serious about trying to end this brutal war in Ukraine.
Will he look to the leadership role the United States played in 1995 to persuade the leaders of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia to lay down their arms and forge a peace agreement as a model? Or will he channel Neville Chamberlain and capitulate to Russia’s demands that Ukraine give up territory and forgo ever joining NATO, in exchange for vacuous assurances that Putin has no further ambitions in Europe? Only the first path has a chance of producing the result that Trump desires and Ukraine deserves. The second path hinges on a promise as empty as the one Adolph Hitler gave the British Prime Minister in 1938.
It was 30 years ago this summer that the United States realized it had little choice but to step in and try to stop a war that threatened European security and stability—and by extension U.S. interests—after UN and European troops failed to halt Serbian aggression against Bosnia and avert 100,000 deaths.
Led by Richard Holbrooke with support from President Bill Clinton, Washington secured the agreement of each warring party to fundamental principles that would form the basis for peace talks. Later that fall, the three leaders of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia sat down with U.S. negotiators at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio to begin talks. After an intense month—and more than a few sleepless nights—we hammered out an agreement. The Dayton Peace Accords were far from perfect, but they stopped the killing and preserved Bosnia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty.
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As with any deal, there must be something in it for all sides, with consequences for those that fail to engage constructively. Core principles that guided the Bosnia negotiations are not dissimilar to those that can bring Moscow and Kiev to the table. The first step—which could be agreed in days—is an immediate cease-fire along current front lines, without any preconditions or promises beyond starting talks. The parties must also affirm the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and internationally recognized borders of every state in the region, acknowledging the rule (to which they are already bound) that borders can only be changed by mutual agreement. This is consistent with the President’s suggestion of land swaps, provided that they are consensual, with the precise boundary—an issue that nearly derailed the Bosnia talks—decided as part of an overall settlement.
The question of potential NATO membership is sensitive and should also be left for formal negotiations. Ukraine should retain the right to apply but could agree to defer it for several years or for as long as a peace agreement remains in force. During this time, Ukraine would require ironclad security guarantees from the West, likely by European forces in the first instance. This period would enable Kiev to bolster its ability to deter future Russian attacks, particularly if it opts not to join NATO, or is not admitted.
Most important as the President approaches this initial meeting is that Putin is not rewarded for his aggression, for geopolitical reasons beyond the illegality and immorality of his actions. Doing so would risk greater conflict in Europe and Asia, likely dragging in the United States and undercutting Trump’s desire to avoid war. Putin makes no secret of his dream of seizing all of Ukraine—which he claims is part of Russia—and regards the three Baltic Republics—now NATO members—as within Moscow’s sphere of influence. Moreover, China is watching all of this closely. Any show of weakness by the President in acquiescing to Moscow’s demands will fuel Beijing’s ambition to seize Taiwan, as well as encourage Kim Jong Un—another Putin ally—to use force against South Korea.
Moreover Russia, despite its economic challenges, has yet to feel serious economic pain. The leverage Trump utilized these past few weeks—from expressing disappointment with Putin to imposing secondary tariffs on India for continuing to buy Russian oil—has gotten the Russian leader’s attention, but is not yet enough to secure a breakthrough. To get Putin to serious talks, the President will need to increase—not decrease—pressure on Moscow by being ready to announce additional measures. China, not India, for example, is the largest consumer of Russian oil. The Trump Administration should be ready to cut off that avenue, and be willing to suspend any sanction only in stages, tied to compliance with a ceasefire, troop withdrawals, and the terms of a final agreement.
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Increasing the pace and scope of arms deliveries is another important tool Washington can ramp up. The Trump Administration has been creative in designing a strategy of European partners purchasing American weapons for Ukraine. For instance, it recently announced such a deal for Patriot missile components. But much more material support, along with tougher sanctions, will be needed to persuade Russia it is time to end this war.
Washington can certainly offer incentives to Putin to cooperate, as long as they do not kick in until an overall agreement is reached. The G7 was once the G8 and, as Trump describes it, Putin was insulted by being thrown out of that group of world economic leaders. Moreover, U.S-Russia trade was never significant, but has potential. Getting both back on track, along with cooperation on energy and infrastructure projects—and even real estate deals—at the right time would make sense.
While Trump’s instinct is right that a solution is possible now, it won’t result from trusting Putin or letting him off the hook for invading Ukraine, seizing 20% of its territory, and continuing attacks against its soldiers and civilians. And it won’t happen without Ukraine and European allies in the room if serious talks do begin. As the President tries hard to bring the parties together to hash out an overall settlement, he should also remember that no deal is better than a bad deal.
Contact us at letters@time.com.
