America’s most notorious jewel thief, Larry Lawton, has sensationally weighed in on the recent Louvre Museum heist, branding the four robbers as “amateurs” and unveiling a shocking, controversial method for smuggling high-value stolen items that he himself once employed. His no-holds-barred critique exposes what he believes were glaring errors in the $102 million daylight robbery and raises questions about potential inside help.
The art world was stunned on Sunday, October 19, when four thieves brazenly stole eight pieces from France’s crown jewels, valued at $102 million, from the seemingly impenetrable Louvre Museum. The heist took just seven minutes, a feat that would typically earn respect, but according to America’s most infamous jewel thief, Larry Lawton, the perpetrators were far from professionals.
Lawton, a reformed ex-con who once looted 25 jewelry stores across the U.S. East Coast, expressed his disdain for the robbers’ “amateurish” mistakes. His most shocking revelation, however, involved a disturbing smuggling trick he called “suitcasing” – a method he believes the Louvre thieves might have used to transport their ill-gotten gains out of the country.
The Master’s Scathing Critique: “They’re Not Professionals Like I Was”
Larry Lawton, whose criminal career in the 1980s and ’90s saw him haul an estimated $18 million worth of items, minced no words when assessing the Louvre robbers. He lambasted them for their sloppiness, particularly for dropping the Empress Eugenie’s imperial crown while making their escape. “They’re not professionals like I was,” Lawton stated bluntly to the New York Post. “I robbed 25 f***ing stores and I never dropped the jewelry, no less a f***ing crown!”
Beyond the dropped crown, Lawton pointed to other critical errors: the thieves reportedly left behind a glove and even attempted to set fire to a stolen work truck and ladder used in the break-in, failing to destroy evidence. Such oversights earned them the labels of “idiots” and “amateurs” from the veteran criminal.
The Disturbing Smuggling Method: “Suitcasing”
One of Lawton’s most shocking revelations concerned how the robbers might have transported the priceless jewels without detection. If they planned to flee the country by plane, he argued, they wouldn’t risk hand luggage. Instead, they would resort to a method he calls “suitcasing.”
This method, as Lawton explained, involves “inserting something in your rect**.” He elaborated to the New York Post, “Believe it or not, depending on the size, you could take some of that jewelry apart and literally ‘suitcase’ it.”
Lawton candidly shared his own experiences with extreme concealment, detailing how he once hid a knife during his looting days. “You have seven extra inches in your an**, and the reason I know this is [because] I’ve actually had a knife up my a**,” he said. He described a makeshift holster: “You put a knife in half of a [travel] toothbrush holder and put masking tape on the other end.” This insight offers a chilling glimpse into the desperate measures some thieves might take.
Was It an Inside Job?
Lawton, who was arrested in 1996 and spent 11 years behind bars before reforming his life, also speculates that the Louvre heist may have been an “inside job.” He argues that the robbers’ precision suggests an intimate knowledge of the museum’s layout and security vulnerabilities.
“How did they know that you could even get through that glass that wasn’t penetrable?” Lawton questioned to NewsNation. “How did they know exactly what window and stuff to go through? How did they know that construction stuff was there?” The thieves, posing as construction workers, used a furniture hoist truck and an extendable ladder to access a balcony and cracked high-end showcases without shattering glass, indicating advanced knowledge.
He clarified that an “inside element” doesn’t necessarily mean direct involvement from a museum employee. “If a person was married to a tour guide, if I’m married to a tour guide and I want to rob that place, you’re going to know everything you know.” This highlights how seemingly innocent information could be leveraged by criminals.
The Irresistible “High” of the Heist
Despite condemning the robbers’ lack of professionalism, Lawton acknowledged the powerful allure of a successful heist. Having “done every dr** in the book,” he insists there’s no comparison to the rush of stealing millions.
“There’s no high like walking out of a jewelry store knowing you got $1 million in a f***ing bag,” he told the New York Post, describing the intense adrenaline flow. This insight offers a unique perspective into the psychological motivations behind such high-stakes crimes.
Louvre’s Security Under Fire
Amidst the manhunt for the four robbers, Louvre director Laurence des Cars publicly acknowledged “terrible failures” on the museum’s part. Testifying before the French Senate, she admitted that the audacity of the heist exposed significant weaknesses, including a shortage of security cameras outside the monument and a failure to “detect the arrival of the thieves soon enough.”
Des Cars specifically noted that security cameras did not cover the balcony used for entry by the thieves, and while alarms functioned, only one camera faced the critical access point. French President Emmanuel Macron has since ordered an acceleration of security upgrades, and the Apollo Gallery, where the theft occurred, remains closed. These admissions underscore the critical nature of Lawton’s “inside job” theory and the broader security concerns.
The Community Reacts: A Laughing Stock?
The online community has been quick to react to both the heist and Lawton’s colorful commentary. Many echoed Lawton’s sentiment regarding the Louvre’s security.
- “The security system in the Louvre is really a laughing stock of the world,” one user commented online, a sentiment that reflects widespread public disbelief at the museum’s vulnerabilities.
- Another comment highlighted the staggering efficiency of the crime: “Stealing 88 million euros in 7 minutes.”
- Users also reflected on the broader implications, with one discussing “theories about buyers in heist movies,” and another questioning “800 movies made about a scenario and prevention failures.”
These reactions demonstrate a common fascination with high-profile heists and a critical eye toward institutional security, resonating deeply with Lawton’s experienced perspective.
