The Michigan Court of Appeals has decisively ruled against granting legal ‘personhood’ to chimpanzees, thereby denying them the right to challenge their confinement at the DeYoung Family Zoo. This decision, which reiterated the common law treatment of animals as property, has been met with disappointment by the Nonhuman Rights Project, who are now poised to escalate their groundbreaking case to the Michigan Supreme Court.
In a highly anticipated decision on October 17, 2025, the Michigan Court of Appeals delivered a significant ruling that reverberates through the animal rights community. The court affirmed a lower court’s decision, holding that chimpanzees are not considered “persons” under Michigan law and are therefore ineligible for habeas corpus relief. This means the seven chimpanzees at the DeYoung Family Zoo in Wallace, Michigan, will remain in confinement, at least for now.
The ruling stems from a petition filed by the Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. (NhRP), a nonprofit animal welfare organization dedicated to securing legal rights for nonhuman animals. The NhRP had sought the transfer of the chimpanzees to a sanctuary, arguing that their confinement violated their fundamental right to bodily liberty. However, the appellate court’s decision, delivered by Judges Matthew Ackerman, Brock Swartzle, and Christopher Trebilcock, firmly upheld the traditional legal framework that categorizes animals as property.
The Nonhuman Rights Project’s Enduring Fight for Personhood
The Nonhuman Rights Project (NhRP) has been at the forefront of the movement to grant legal rights to nonhuman animals, particularly those with complex cognitive abilities. Their mission is rooted in challenging the common law status of animals as mere property and advocating for their recognition as legal “persons” capable of possessing fundamental rights. This landmark case, Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. DeYoung Family Zoo, LLC, is a continuation of their broader legal strategy, which has seen similar efforts in other jurisdictions, attempting to establish that self-aware, autonomous beings should be afforded legal protections beyond welfare regulations.
The lawsuit originated in 2023 when the NhRP filed a 109-page complaint in the 41st Circuit Court in Menominee County. The complaint alleged that the chimpanzees at the DeYoung Family Zoo were denied conditions appropriate for their species, including sufficient social interaction and year-round outdoor space. The NhRP contended that these chimpanzees, possessing “numerous cognitively complex abilities,” should be recognized as autonomous beings whose confinement requires legal justification.
To bolster their arguments, the rights group submitted declarations from prominent experts, including the late primatologist Jane Goodall, who attested to chimpanzees’ advanced cognitive abilities and intricate social networks. These declarations aimed to provide scientific backing for the claim that chimpanzees possess characteristics that warrant legal personhood.
The Legal Battleground: Habeas Corpus and Animal Property Status
The core of the legal challenge rested on the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, a legal remedy typically used to bring a person before a court to determine if their detention is lawful. The NhRP argued that the chimpanzees were unlawfully confined and deprived of their liberty, thereby necessitating habeas relief. However, the trial court summarily dismissed the petition, asserting that nonhuman animals are not “persons” for habeas purposes.
On appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals first resolved a long-standing jurisdictional split, confirming its authority to hear the case. The court explained that legislative amendments in 2016 incorporated the Michigan Supreme Court’s definition of “final judgment,” making a trial court’s denial of a habeas corpus petition appealable as of right. With jurisdiction established, the court then delved into the merits of the case.
The appellate court’s decision hinged on the interpretation of “person” within the context of habeas corpus. It held that habeas protections are reserved for legal “persons” and that, under common law, this category has never included animals. The court unequivocally stated, “the chimpanzees are animals, and as the common law authorities all make clear, animals — including wild animals, such as these chimpanzees — are treated as property.” To underscore this point, the court cited settled Michigan authority, which holds that dogs “are the property of the owner as much as any other animal which one may have or keep.” The authoritative definition of habeas corpus can be found on the Cornell Law School’s Legal Information Institute website.
Crucially, the court also rejected the NhRP’s plea to modify the common law, noting that only the Michigan Supreme Court possesses the authority to overturn its prior decisions or make such a “significant departure from Michigan law.” This stance effectively punts the responsibility for any potential change in legal precedent to the state’s highest judicial body.
Oral Arguments: Drawing the Line of Liberty
The oral arguments before the Michigan Court of Appeals on October 14, 2025, provided a glimpse into the complex ethical and legal questions at play. Jake Davis, senior staff attorney for the Nonhuman Rights Project, argued passionately for the chimpanzees’ common law right to bodily liberty, asserting that their autonomy was being violated by their confinement. He urged the court to issue an order to show cause, allowing the defense to challenge their allegations.
The judges, particularly Judge Brock Swartzle, engaged Davis in a lively discussion that extended beyond the initial 15-minute allocation. Swartzle probed whether a being’s ability to act autonomously should automatically guarantee a right to liberty, contrasting it with the human “social contract” where individuals give up certain liberties for rights. He famously questioned the practical implications, asking, “If we had five, I don’t know, elephants or chimps in this courtroom, I don’t know that they’d all be sitting down as nicely as everyone else in this room.”
Swartzle also pressed Davis on where the court would draw the line if chimpanzees were granted personhood, posing the question: “How extraordinary are you willing to go? Elephants, dolphins, chimpanzees, dogs, cats?” Davis responded by suggesting a case-by-case or species-by-species determination, acknowledging the complexity of such a distinction. Following the decision, Davis expressed profound disappointment, feeling the court had not fully considered the oral arguments. He critically noted that the court’s position, “taken to its logical conclusion—would mean children and the disabled cannot have legal rights,” highlighting a deep concern about the precedent set.
Historical Context and Broader Implications of Animal Personhood
The concept of legal personhood, traditionally reserved for humans and certain legal entities like corporations, is a complex and evolving area of law. Historically, animals have been viewed purely as property, devoid of any inherent rights. However, the rise of the animal rights movement in recent decades has spurred calls for a re-evaluation of this status, particularly for species demonstrating advanced cognitive abilities, self-awareness, and complex social structures. Organizations like the Nonhuman Rights Project have spearheaded efforts to grant legal personhood to nonhuman animals, citing their capacity for suffering, autonomy, and intrinsic value. More about their global advocacy efforts can be explored on the Nonhuman Rights Project official website.
This case in Michigan is part of a broader, global conversation. While direct legal personhood for nonhuman animals remains largely elusive in the United States, there have been some movements internationally. For example, certain countries have recognized some level of legal protection for animals that acknowledges their sentience, moving beyond simple property status. The Michigan court’s emphasis on “no natural stopping point” for defining intelligent animals as persons highlights a fundamental challenge in this debate: if intelligence is the criterion, how is it measured, and where does the line get drawn? The ruling underscores the immense legal hurdle in challenging centuries of common law that defines animals as property.
What Comes Next: The Supreme Court and the Future of Animal Rights in Michigan
Unsurprisingly, the Nonhuman Rights Project has announced its intention to appeal this decision to the Michigan Supreme Court. This elevates the stakes considerably, as the Supreme Court is the only body capable of making the “significant departure from Michigan law” that the appellate court said was necessary to grant personhood to nonhuman animals. A review by the state’s highest court would signify a pivotal moment for animal rights jurisprudence in Michigan and potentially set a precedent for other states.
If the Michigan Supreme Court agrees to hear the case, it will face the profound question of whether to reinterpret established legal definitions of “person” to include nonhuman beings. Such a decision could have far-reaching implications, not only for the welfare of animals in zoos and research facilities but also for the broader legal framework surrounding animal ownership, protection, and ethical treatment. Conversely, if the Supreme Court declines to hear the appeal, the current ruling by the Court of Appeals will stand, reinforcing the traditional legal status of animals as property in Michigan.
The outcome of this ongoing legal battle holds immense importance for zoos, sanctuaries, animal welfare organizations, and anyone interested in the evolving discourse around animal rights. It forces a public conversation on the ethical boundaries of human-animal relationships and the potential for legal systems to adapt to our increasing understanding of animal intelligence and sentience.
